ИСТИНА

Games of inspection and corruption are well developed in the game-theoretic literature. However, there are only a few publications that approach these problems from the evolutionary point of view. We develop generalised evolutionary approach in a setting of the two-level hierarchy, where a local inspector can be corrupted and is further controlled by the higher authority, thus combining the modeling of inspection and corruption in a unifying setting. We obtain a result that can be called the “principle of quadratic fines”: starting from the quadratic growth of the fine function, one can effectively control the level of violations. Concrete settings that we have in mind are illegal logging, the sales of products with substandard quality, and tax evasion. The talk extends the ideas from the paper Vassili N. Kolokoltsov. Inspection -corruption game of illegal logging and other violations: generalized evolutionary approach. Mathematics MDPI 2021, 9(14), 1619.